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Allowing "Lawless Police Conduct" in Order
to Forbid "Lawless Civilian Conduct": The
Court Further Erodes the Exclusionary Rule
in Utah v. Strieff
by GEORGE M. DERY III*
Introduction
The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Fourth
Amendment's' exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy" rather
than "a personal constitutional right." 2  Therefore, as with any tool, the
exclusionary remedy should only be used when its benefits outweigh its
3 4
costs3 (i.e., when it is the right tool for the job). Ironically, in Utah v.
Strieff, the Court has failed to heed its own wise advice.' In considering
whether a police officer's illegal seizure of a person tainted his later
recovery of methamphetamine,6 the Strieff Court applied an attenuation
* Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Administration, &
Justice; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, 1987; B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1983. The author would like to thank
his research assistant, Daniel Boughter, B.A. Criminal Justice, California State University
Fullerton.
I. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974).
3. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907.
4. BlainsFarmAndFleet, The Right Tool for the Job, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2012), https://
www.youtubc.com/watch?v=fb7HSAl kKNY.
5. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
6. Id. at 2060.
[393]
analysis from Brown v. Illinois.7 Problematically, the Brown Court and its
progeny focused on whether an unlawful seizure tainted a later
incriminating statement-a situation where the emotional or psychological
impact of official illegality was the central concern.8 In contrast, the Court
in Strieff which considered whether an illegal stop sullied physical
evidence obtained during a search of clothing, noted that the mental state of
the person wearing that clothing offered scant insight for the taint analysis.9
Still, the Strieff Court dutifully applied several of the Brown Court's factors
in spite of its prohibition against using the wrong rule for the job. It was as
if, faced with the task of tightening a Phillips screw, the Court used a
flathead screwdriver. The Strieff Court's blunder was particularly
unfortunate because the Court could have employed a simpler rule to obtain
a better result.'0
Strieff s placement of its own case in Brown's procrustean bed was not
the Court's only error. The Strieff Court, in attempting to minimize the
officer's illegality with a rendition of all of his lawful acts, further drained
the vitality of the exclusionary rule." Further, the Strieff Court, in limiting
exclusion to only purposeful and flagrant police illegality, set a
dangerously low standard for police professionalism.12 Finally, in allowing
an outstanding arrest warrant, by itself, to cleanse taint, the Strieff Court
violated the Brown Court's prohibition against using a per se rule to
cleanse taint. 13
In Part I, this Article reviews the Court's initial reluctance to adopt the
exclusionary rule, its ultimate embrace of the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence as a constitutional mandate, and its limitation of this rule
with the attenuation of taint analysis. Part II presents Strieff, including an
overview of its factual background and an examination of the Court's
opinion. Part III considers the various concerns created by the Strieff
7. Id. at 2062; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
8. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
216-18 (1979); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-08 (1980); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S.
687, 690-92 (1982); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 23 (1990); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626,
633 (2003).
9. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
10. The fact that the Court simply could have used a rule of proximate cause based on
reasonable foreseeability is fully explored below in Part IV(B).
11. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062-63 (2016).
12. Id. at 2063.
13. Thus, the Strieff Court not only improperly chose to employ Brown, but also applied its
analysis in a manner inconsistent with the reasoning of this case. Id. at 2059; Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975).
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Court's curious application of the attenuation analysis to the facts in this
case.
I. The Birth and Slow Decline of the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule
A. The Court's Initial Reluctance to Adopt an Exclusionary Rule
The Court's relationship with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule has been fraught with ambivalence and contradiction. The Court first
authorized the exclusion of evidence upon constitutional violation in Boyd
v. United States.14 In Boyd, the federal government charged the defendants
with fraud in importing cases of plate glass into the Port of New York
without paying mandatory duties.15 The prosecutor in the case subpoenaed
the defendants for the business invoice for twenty-nine cases of glass.16
Although the defendants produced the invoice, they objected to its
admission into evidence as unconstitutional.17
The Boyd Court believed this case affected "the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security" by involving an invasion of the
individual's "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty."
18
The Boyd Court saw the "extortion of a man's own testimony, or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime" as
implicating both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.19 The Court concluded
that the subpoena and the admission of the subpoenaed invoices were
"unconstitutional and void." 20 Since admitting illegally obtained evidence
was unconstitutional, suppressing the evidence-by means of an
exclusionary rule-was the only constitutional choice.
Less than twenty years later, in the gambling paraphernalia case
Adams v. New York, the Court reversed course, explicitly refusing to
suppress illegally seized private papers.21 The Adams Court ruled that even
if the papers were illegally seized, such a fact did not create a "valid
objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue."22 If the
14. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
15. Id. at 617-18.
16. Id at 618.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 630.
19. id.
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
21. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 586, 595 (1904).
22. Id at 595.
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items of evidence were relevant, the Court would "not take notice how they
were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully." 23
The Court's view of the exclusionary rule shifted a mere decade later
in Weeks v. United States.2 4 Although the Weeks Court also involved the
unlawful seizure of gambling papers,25 it had one significant difference
with Adams: The illegality in Weeks came from "the Federal Government
and its agencies" rather than state officials.26  In the limited sphere of
federal illegality, the Weeks Court ruled that the admission into trial of the
letters obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was "prejudicial
error."27 In support of its ruling, the Court dramatically declared that if the
private papers in the case can
be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the [Fourth]
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution.28
The Court warned that the "praiseworthy" efforts to bring criminals to
justice "are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their
embodiment in the fundamental law of the land."29
After creating the exclusionary rule in such striking fashion at the
federal level, the Court refused to employ it against wayward state officials
in Wolf v. Colorado.30 While the Wolf Court readily accepted that the
security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment was "basic to a free
society," and therefore applied to state officials, it refused to enforce this
"basic right" by excluding evidence.3 1 The Court considered imposition of
an exclusionary rule on the states to be a dogmatic act that would preclude
exploration of the "varying solutions" that could solve police illegality.32
23. Id.
24. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 398.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 393.
29. Id.
30. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
31. Id. at 27-28, 33.
32. Id at 28.
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The Wolf Court limited Weeks, claiming that it was a "matter of judicial
implication" rather than an explicit requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.33 The beginning of the twentieth century thus provided little
fertile ground for the exclusionary rule to flourish.
B. The Court's Embrace of the Exclusionary Rule
In 1961, the Court fully endorsed the exclusionary rule for state
violations of the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio.34  In Mapp,
Cleveland police officers broke into Mapp's home in "defiance of the law"
to search for a bombing suspect.35 The officers instead found sexually
explicit materials.3 6 When Mapp challenged the officers' entry, the police
offered her a "paper, claimed to be a warrant."37 Mapp then grabbed the
paper and placed it "in her bosom."38  Police struggled with Mapp to
recover the "warrant," running "roughshod" over her until she "yelled (and)
pleaded" in pain.39 When the government failed to produce the warrant in
court, the trial judge doubted whether it ever existed.40
The Court in Mapp found the WolfCourt's reading of the exclusionary
rule as "judicially implied" unconvincing, recasting Weeks as a rule "of
constitutional origin."41 Mapp saw the exclusionary rule serving two
important purposes: (1) it deterred police illegality by compelling "respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it"; and (2) it served "the imperative of
judicial integrity" by preventing judges from sullying themselves in
admitting unlawfully obtained evidence.42  The Mapp Court therefore
extended the exclusionary rule to the states, holding "that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court."43 Without the exclusionary
33. Id.
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
35. Id. at 644.
36. The police recovered "lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs." Id. at
643.
37. Id. at 644.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 645.
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645 (1961).
41. Id at 646, 649.
42. Id at 656, 659.
43. Id at 655; The Court in Mapp ruled, "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy
has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the
Federal Government." Id.
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rule, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures would only be "'a
form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties."" The Court in Mapp deemed the
exclusionary rule "an essential part" of the Fourth Amendment.4 5 To deny
the exclusionary rule to those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been
violated would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment."46
The Mapp Court's dramatic language masked continuing ambivalence
among some justices about the constitutional basis of the exclusionary rule.
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, stated that he was "still not
persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to
bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects
seized from him in violation of its commands."47 His argument was based
on simple textual analysis.48 Since "the Fourth Amendment does not itself
contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence,"
Justice Black doubted the exclusionary rule "could properly be inferred
from nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches
and seizures."49 In his dissent, Justice Harlan complained that the Court, in
creating the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, had
"forgotten the sense of judicial restraint."50  Writing separately, Justice
Stewart expressed "no view as to the merits of the constitutional issue
which the Court today decides."5 Instead, he would have decided the
matter on the issue of the "rights of free thought and expression assured
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment."52  Justice Stewart
would later explain that the Court had originally accepted the case on a
First Amendment issue, only to mysteriously switch the basis of its ruling
to the Fourth Amendment.53  Thus, the Court's dramatic creation of the
exclusionary rule in Mapp might have been built on a less than solid
foundation, making it vulnerable to erosion from future cases.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 657.
46. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
47. Id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 672 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 672 (Memorandum of Mr. Justice Stewart).
52. Id.
53. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1368
(1983).
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C. The Court's "Attenuation of Taint" Limit on the Exclusionary Rule
The Court has long been troubled by the prospect of officers
benefitting from their own illegal conduct.54  Such exploitation of a
constitutional violation occurred in the 1920 case, Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, in which federal agents, "without a shadow of authority,"
performed "a clean sweep of all the books, papers[,] and documents" found
in the office of Silverthorne and his father. When the defendants moved
to have their papers returned to them, the district court ruled in their
favor.6 The government, having previously made copies of the papers
ordered to be returned, pursued an indictment "based upon the knowledge
thus obtained" from the illegally seized, copied, and returned documents.
The prosecution then subpoenaed the defendants to produce the originals.5 8
When the defendants refused to comply with the subpoena, they were
found in contempt of court.59
The Court, finding the prosecution's position untenable, declared:
The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is
that although of course its seizure was an outrage which
the Government now regrets, it may study the papers
before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the
knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a
more regular form to produce them; that the protection of
the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any
advantages that the Government can gain over the object of
its pursuit by doing the forbidden act.
Still, the Court in Silverthorne recognized limits to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. Illegally obtained facts did not become
54. Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
55. Id. at 390.
56. Id. at 390-91.
57. Id. at 391.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920). The Court further
noted, "The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure,
seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise
it would not have had." Id.
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irretrievably "sacred and inaccessible."61 Instead, the Court understood
that illegally gained evidence could be purged of its original taint.62
The Court first mentioned attenuation as a method for cleansing taint
in Nardone v. United States, a case involving wiretapping in violation of a
Congressional statute.63  In Nardone, the Court declared that illegally
acquired evidence would not only be excluded from court, it would "not be
used at all."64 Still, the Court recognized that evidence could be cleansed if
the connection between the government impropriety and the evidence had
"become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."65 A full analysis of the
specifics of this doctrine would only be provided two decades later in
Wong Sun v. United States.66
In Wong Sun, federal agents, pursuing a tip about narcotics, went to a
laundry where James Toy lived.67 When the agents identified themselves
to Toy, he slammed his door on them and ran "down the hallway through
the laundry to his living quarters at the back where his wife and child were
sleeping in a bedroom."6 8 The agents then broke open the door, chased
Toy into his bedroom, drew a pistol on Toy, handcuffed him, and accused
him of selling narcotics.69 Toy denied ever selling drugs, but directed the
agents to a man named "Johnny."70 The narcotics agents then immediately
visited Johnny Yee-finding heroin that Yee said he had obtained from
Toy.
Moreover, after piecing together statements from both Yee and Toy
that connected a third person-Wong Sun-to the heroin, police went to
Wong Sun's home and illegally arrested him.72 After arraignment on
federal narcotics charges, Wong Sun was released on his own
61. Id.
62. Id. The Court offered as an example the government gaining evidence through an
independent source. Id. Later, in Dunaway v. New York, the Court cited Silverthorne for the
attenuation doctrine (rather than for the independent source rule), declaring: "There remains the
question whether the connection between this unconstitutional police conduct and the
incriminating statements and sketches obtained during petitioner's illegal detention was
nevertheless sufficiently attenuated to permit the use at trial of the statements and sketches."
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (emphasis added).
63. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939).
64. Id. at 341.
65. Id.
66. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
67. Id. at 473.




72. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 475 (1963).
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recognizance.7 3 The government later questioned Toy, Yee, and Wong Sun
at the station after explaining to each that any statement could be used
against him and that each had a right to have an attorney present.74 Toy
and Wong Sun both spoke with the agent who questioned him, but refused
to sign the resulting statement.75
The Court in Wong Sun had to decide whether the illegal arrest of Toy
mandated the exclusion not only of the statement Toy gave in his bedroom,
but also of the heroin agents obtained from Yee by following up on Toy's
statement.76 Also at issue was the admissibility against Wong Sun of his
own stationhouse statements due to the illegality of his arrest.77 The Court
first focused on the evidence admitted against Toy. It noted that Toy's
statements in his bedroom, obtained by violating the Fourth Amendment,
had to be excluded if deemed the "'fruits' of the agents' unlawful action."78
Wong Sun's "broad exclusionary rule" barred the use of any evidence,
whether obtained directly-or indirectly-from a Fourth Amendment
violation.79  The Court did not base its taint analysis on mere factual
causation, explaining, "We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police."80 Instead, the proper inquiry was "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which
instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint."8 ' In other words, did the police use or take advantage of their own
unlawful behavior as a means of gathering evidence? If so, that use or
exploitation tainted the evidence thus obtained.
The government in Wong Sun urged that the agents did not exploit
their Fourth Amendment violation to obtain Toy's bedroom statement
because any taint flowing from the illegal entry and arrest was attenuated
by Toy's "intervening independent act of a free will." 82 The Court was
unconvinced, noting that at least half a dozen officers broke down Toy's
door in order to chase him into his bedroom where his family had been
73. Id.
74. Id. at 476. Wong Sun, occurring in 1963, was a pre-Miranda case.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
77. Id. at 491.
78. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
79. Id. at 484-85.
80. Id. at 487-88.
81. Id. at 488.
82. Id. at 486.
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83sleeping. The Court doubted whether after such an intrusion, while
arrested and handcuffed, Toy's statement could be "an act of free will" free
of taint.84 Toy-both a father and a husband-who was illegally chased
into his own home and handcuffed in front of his wife and child, was
caught in an atmosphere filled with tension and fear. The agents, in
obtaining a statement given under these circumstances, exploited their own
original illegality. The heroin obtained from Yee was likewise tainted by
the agents' illegal arrest of Toy because the prosecutor candidly admitted,
"we wouldn't have found those drugs except that Mr. Toy helped us to."85
The Court found that this was not "a case in which the connection between
the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged
evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."'86 The Court
saw officials taking advantage of their own unlawful conduct as the key to
its analysis, noting, "We think it clear that the narcotics were 'come at by
the exploitation of that illegality' and hence that they may not be used
against Toy."
The Court in Wong Sun adhered to its exploitation formulation when
deciding that, "Wong Sun's unsigned confession was not the fruit of (the
unlawful) arrest, and was therefore properly admitted at trial."8 While the
agents had clearly arrested Wong Sun illegally, they did nothing to exploit
that illegality, such as forcing him to sit in a jail cell to soften him up.
Instead, Wong Sun was released on his own recognizance. He "returned
voluntarily several days later to make the statement."89  This
relinquishment of control over Wong Sun, for a matter of days, caused "the
connection between the arrest and the statement [to] become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.""
A dozen years after Wong Sun, the Court developed a multi-factor test
for assessing the attenuation of taint in Brown v. Illinois.91 In Brown,
Chicago Police officers obtained two Mirandized statements from a suspect
after illegally arresting him at gunpoint.92 The Illinois courts had assumed
that the Miranda warnings the police had provided Brown, "by
83. Id.
84. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).
85. Id. at 487.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 488.
88. Id. at 491.
89. Id.
90. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963).
91. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
92. Id. at 592, 594-95.
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themselves," assured that his statements "were of sufficient free will as to
purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest."93 The Court refused to
accept any such per se rule that Miranda warnings, alone, would
automatically cleanse a statement of prior illegality. 94 The Brown Court
worried, "If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the
taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful
the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would
be substantially diluted."9 5  Officers-realizing that any taint from an
illegal seizure of a person could be dissipated "by the simple expedient of
giving Miranda warnings"-would be incentivized to make stops without
proper justification.
The Brown Court noted that, while Wong Sun did consider the
voluntariness of Toy's statement, "it was only to judge whether the
statement 'was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of
the unlawful invasion."'97 In deciding whether a confession was freely
given, all facts had to be considered because no "single fact" was
"dispositive."98 The Brown Court explained, "The workings of the human
mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to
permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic
test."9 The first factor "in determining whether the confession is obtained
by exploitation of an illegal arrest," was whether police gave the arrestee
Miranda warnings.1 Brown's second factor assessed the "temporal
proximity of the arrest and the confession," while its third factor identified
"the presence of intervening circumstances."t01 The fourth factor weighed
"the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct."102  In assessing
93. Id at 600.
94. Id. at 603.
95. Id. at 602.
96. Id.
97. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975). "In order for the causal chain, between the
illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken," the statement must be
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint." Id. at 601 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Brown Court intoned, "The voluntariness of the statement is a threshold
requirement." Id. at 604. If the statement was not deemed voluntary at the outset, a court could
forgo the rest of the rule. Id.




102. Id at 604.
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these factors, the Court placed the "burden of showing admissibility" upon
the government.103
The Court in Brown concluded that the government had failed to meet
its burden proving the statements' admissibility.10 Although police did
fulfill Brown's first factor by providing their arrestee with Miranda
warnings,105 the second factor of "temporal proximity" was not satisfied
because, "Brown's first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by
less than two hours."'" This, in turn, meant, "there was no intervening
event of significance whatsoever" to satisfy the third factor.' 07 The Court
was also troubled when considering its fourth factor-purpose and
flagrancy-because the arrest's "impropriety" was "obvious" and "virtually
conceded" by the case's two detectives.10 8 The Court noted:
The arrest, both in design and in execution, was
investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this
expedition for evidence in the hope that something might
turn up. The manner in which Brown's arrest was affected
gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause
surprise, fright, and confusion.'09
The facts proving purposefulness and flagrancy were quite dramatic.
When Brown returned to his home, he saw a gun pointed at him through a
window and heard the words, "Don't move, you are under arrest."110 Then
another man, also armed with a gun, came up behind him and repeated he
was under arrest."' Such theatrics during an illegal arrest further hobbled
attenuation.
The Court employed the Brown Court's attenuation formula in
Dunaway v. New York, a case involving a killing during an attempted
robbery at a pizza parlor.12 Lacking evidence for a warrant, police picked
up Dunaway at a neighbor's house, put him in an interrogation room at the
103. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 594.
106. Id. at 604.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 605.
109. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975).
110. Id at 592.
111. Id.
112. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 202 (1979).
404 [Vol. 44:4
Summer 2017] ERODING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN UTAH V. STRIEFF
police station, and gave him his Miranda warnings.'13  Dunaway then
"made statements and drew sketches that incriminated him in the crime."I14
The trial court denied Dunaway's motion to suppress his statements and
sketches and a jury convicted him of attempted robbery and felony
murder."5
Concluding that the officers illegally arrested Dunaway,"6 the Court
considered whether the Brown Court's factors cleansed the statements and
sketches of taint. Dunaway's receipt of Miranda warnings pointed to the
voluntariness of his statement, allowing police to satisfy Brown's
"threshold" requirement. Miranda warnings alone, however, could not
cleanse taint because admitting the confession on this basis only would
allow "law enforcement officers to violate the Fourth Amendment with
impunity, safe in the knowledge that they could wash their hands in the
'procedural safeguards' of the Fifth."" 8 The Brown Court's remaining
factors failed to cleanse taint." 9 Dunaway was exposed to no "intervening
event of significance." 20  Moreover, police illegality was flagrant, as
officers seized him "without probable cause in the hope that something
might turn up." 21 Thus, Dunaway's statement simply remained tainted.
122
The Court next applied Brown's attenuation factors in Rawlings v.
Kentucky, which was a case arising from a controlled substance
conviction. 123 In Rawlings, six officers executed a warrant for a person
named Lawrence Marquess, who turned out to be absent from the home.124
During their unsuccessful search for Marquess, police saw marijuana seeds
and smelled marijuana smoke, causing four officers to detain the home's
four visitors and one occupant while the other two other officers left to
obtain a search warrant.125 Police only allowed the visitors-among whom
were Vanessa Cox and David Rawlings-to leave if they consented to a
113. Id. at 203.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 215-16.
117. Id. at 216-17.
118. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979).
119. Id. at 218.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Dunaway Court frowned upon the lower court's attempt to distinguish Brown
on the grounds that "the police did not threaten or abuse petitioner" by noting that this required
"putting aside his illegal seizure and detention." Id.
122. Id. at 219.




"body search." 126 Two visitors left after consenting to such a search. 127
During the forty-five minute wait for the officers' return with the search
warrant, persons drank coffee, joked about a dog with a wagging tail, and
listened to a record album.12 8 Upon returning, the officers read both the
warrant and Miranda warnings to the persons who still remained at the
house.129 Then, an officer ordered Cox to empty her purse onto a coffee
table.13 0  Cox complied in emptying "a jar containing 1,800 tablets of
[Lysergic Acid Dietylamide]," as well as other drugs, onto the table.13 1
When Cox told Rawlings to "take what was his," Rawlings "immediately
claimed ownership of controlled substances."l3 2 An officer then searched
Rawlings' person, finding $4,500 cash and a sheathed knife.133 Kentucky
prosecuted Rawlings for possession of controlled substances with the intent
to sell.134 The trial court refused to suppress Rawlings' drugs as well as his
statements claiming ownership of the drugs, convicting him of the
charges. 135
The Court, in assuming Rawlings' detention violated the Fourth
Amendment,136 cautioned that his statements would only be excluded if
they "were the result of his illegal detention."137 Since even those subject
to an illegal seizure "frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will
unaffected by the initial illegality," the Rawlings Court eschewed a "but
for" analysis, choosing instead to apply Brown's attenuation factors.138 The
police fared well with the Brown's first factor, for they provided Rawlings
with Miranda warnings.139 Further, Rawlings himself did not argue that his
admissions were involuntary. ' In assessing Brown's "temporal
proximity" factor, the Rawlings Court noted that although forty-five
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 100, 108.
129. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 (1980). At this time, Cox and Rawlings were
sitting on a couch, with Cox's handbag in the space between them. Id.
130. Id. at 100-01.
131. Id. at 101. The other controlled substances, contained in "a number of smaller vials,"




135. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 101-02 (1980).
136. Id. at 106.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 107.
140. Id. at 110.
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minutes typically "might not suffice to purge the initial taint," here, "the
precise conditions under which the occupants of this house were detained"
boded well for admission.141 The detained visitors could move "freely
about the first floor of the house," drink beverages, and listen to music in
an atmosphere that was "courteous" and "congenial." 42 The Court found
such facts outweighed "the relatively short period of time that elapsed
between the initiation of the detention and petitioner's admissions.14 3
Brown's "intervening circumstances" factor supported purging the
taint because Rawlings' admissions were "apparently spontaneous
reactions to the discovery of his drugs in Cox's purse," and therefore
Rawlings's statements were of "free will unaffected by the initial
illegality."1" The Brown Court's "purpose and flagrancy" factor also
pointed in the government's favor.145  First, the officers, in aiming to
prevent the removal or destruction of marijuana, were merely attempting to
maintain the status quo. 146  Second, rather than being a blatant act of
illegality, the temporary detention of persons "at the scene of suspected
drug activity to secure a search warrant" involved "an open question."47
Third, the belief that a search warrant for a place included the authority to
search those present at the location had only been recently corrected by
court case law.148 Thus, viewing the totality of circumstances, the
government carried its burden of proof that Rawlings' statements were
cleansed of taint.149
The Court also considered Brown's attenuation factors in Taylor v.
Alabama, in which police, lacking probable cause, arrested Taylor for a
grocery store robbery.'" At the station, officers gave Taylor his Miranda
warnings three times, fingerprinted him, and placed him in a lineup.'
5 '
"After a short visit with his girlfriend and a male companion," Taylor wrote
141. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980).
142. Id. at 107-08.
143. Id. at 108.
144. Id. Testimony indicated that Rawlings' motives for claiming the drugs were mixed;
Rawlings did not wish to "pin" all blame on Cox, while at the same time he feared doing anything
that would cause her to give evidence against him. Id. at 109.
145. Id. at 110.
146. Id at 109-110.
147. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 689 (1982).
151. Id. at 689, 691.
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out his confession, which was entered into evidence at his trial, resulting in
his conviction. 152
Since the confession was "obtained through custodial interrogation
after an illegal arrest," the Court in Taylor searched for intervening events
to make it "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."153
While Miranda warnings made the statement voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, such a recitation was "not by itself sufficient to purge the taint
of the illegal arrest."154 Instead, the psychological damage of a Fourth
Amendment violation could only be assessed by a consideration of all of
Brown's attenuation factors.'5 5 The Court found its case to be "a virtual
replica of both Brown and Dunaway" because police arrested Taylor
"without probable cause in the hope that something would turn up," which
resulted in a confession lacking "any meaningful intervening event."1 56
The government's "temporal proximity" argument that the six hours
between Taylor's arrest and confession constituted a longer period of time
than in Brown and Dunaway failed because a few hours difference lost
significance in light of Taylor's subjection to uncounseled custodial
questioning, fingerprinting, and lineup.5 7 When the State offered Taylor's
visit with his "girlfriend and a male companion" as an intervening event,
the Court wondered how this "[five] to [ten] minute visit"-occurring only
after Taylor had already signed a waiver of rights form-"could possibly
have contributed to his ability to consider carefully and objectively his
options and to exercise his free will." 5 8 Indeed, the Court believed that the
girlfriend's emotional upset during the meeting could have further sapped
the suspect's free will.1 59 Applying Brown's purposeful and flagrant factor,
the Taylor Court found the officers' actions as bad as those of police in
Brown and Dunaway because they committed an "investigatory arrest" of
Taylor based on nothing but the "hope that something would turn up."'so
In response to the State's strained plea that the officers acted in "good
faith," the Court refused to recognize any such exception for this case.'6 '
152. Id.
153. Id. at 690.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 690-92.
156. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690-92 (1982).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 692.
160. Id. at 693.
161. In rejecting the State's argument, the Court explained, "To date, we have not recognized
such an exception, and we decline to do so here." Id.
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The Court found Brown's attenuation analysis inapplicable to the next
case involving a confession after an illegal arrest in New York v. Harris.162
Having probable cause that Harris had committed murder, the police
unlawfully arrested him in his apartment in violation of Payton v. New
York, which held that police cannot perform warrantless arrests in the
home.1 63 After receiving Miranda warnings at the station, Harris signed a
written statement admitting to the killing.'TM The New York Court of
Appeals deemed the statement inadmissible because the "connection
between the statement and the arrest was not sufficiently attenuated" under
Brown.165 The Harris Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals,
166
reiterating its rejection of any "but for" causation rule for attenuation.
The Court explained that any exclusion of evidence "must bear some
relation to the purposes which the law is to serve." 67 The Payton Court
meant to protect the "physical integrity" of the home by demanding a
warrant for entry; it was this "sanctity of the home" that the officers in
Harris violated in forgoing a warrant.168 However, nothing in Payton
rendered "unlawful continued custody of the suspect once he is removed
from the house."'69 Since police possessed probable cause to arrest Harris,
his custody, as he sat in the station house, was lawful, in spite of how it
came to be.170 Harris thus differed from Brown and its progeny because
those cases involved evidence that was, "in some sense the product of
illegal governmental activity." 17' In contrast, the Harris Court claimed
"Harris' statement taken at the police station was not the product of being
in unlawful custody. Neither was it the fruit of having been arrested in the
home rather than someplace else." 72
The most recent case before Strieff in which the Court considered the
Brown factors analysis was Kaupp v. Texas.173 In Kaupp, a nineteen-year-
old man, after failing a polygraph examination for the third time, ultimately
162. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
163. Id. at 15-16; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980).
164. Harris, 495 U.S. at 16.
165. Id.
166. Id at 17.
167. Id.
168. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17 (1990).
169. Id. at 18.
170. Id
171. Id.
172. Id at 19.
173. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003).
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confessed to fatally stabbing his half-sister.174 Initially, when Kaupp's
half-brother had implicated him in the killing, sheriffs decided to "get
[Kaupp] in and confront him with what [the brother] had said."'17  After
trying but failing to obtain a warrant, deputies went to Kaupp's home and
woke him up at around 3:00 a.m.17 6 They handcuffed him and took him-
barefoot, in boxer shorts and a T-shirt-to where the body was found and
then to the station.'77 After removing his handcuffs and reading him his
Miranda rights, the deputies questioned Kaupp, who confessed his
involvement after about ten or fifteen minutes into the interrogation.178
The Court in Kaupp declared that, due to the illegal arrest, the
confession had to be suppressed unless it was "an act of free will
[sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion. "79 The
government failed to meet its burden to establish "purgation" of taint
because the deputies, in providing Miranda warnings, fulfilled only one of
Brown's attenuation factors.1so The "temporal proximity" factor did not
favor the government because there was "no indication from the record that
any substantial time passed between Kaupp's removal from his home in
handcuffs and his confession after only [ten] or [fifteen] minutes of
interrogation. Instead of providing "any meaningful intervening event"
between the police illegality and the resulting confession, the record
revealed that the deputies acted flagrantly, leaving Kaupp in a partially
clothed state even though several of them knew that the arrest lacked
probable cause.182 On the record before it, the Kaupp Court ruled, "the
confession must be suppressed."183
H. Utah v. Strieff
A. Facts
In December 2006, an anonymous caller left a message on the South
Salt Lake City Police drug-tip line reporting "narcotics activity" at a
174. Id. at 627-28.
175. Id. at 628.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 628-29.
179. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632 (2003).
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particular house.184 In response, Officer Doug Fackrell, "an [eighteen]-year
law enforcement veteran with specialized training in drug enforcement,"
watched the home for a total of about three hours "off and on for a week or
so."'8 Officer Fackrell observed some "not terribly frequent" "short-term
visits" to the house, which, in his experience, raised suspicion that the
home's occupants were selling drugs.186 Although Officer Fackrell did not
know who owned the house or who lived in it, he decided to detain "the
next person he saw leaving the house."'87 Edward Strieff then exited the
house, prompting Officer Fackrell to choose him.'8 8 The officer later
testified that Strieff "was coming out of the house that I had been watching
and I decided that I'd like to ask somebody if I could find out what was
going on [in] the house."'
89
Since he had not seen Strieff enter the house, Officer Fackrell did not
know how long Strieff had been inside and, therefore, lacked the
information to conclude that he was either a short-term visitor or a resident
of the home.19t Further, since Strieff, in walking away from the residence,
"had done nothing to arouse any suspicion that he was committing a
crime," Officer Fackrell admitted that he had "no reason to stop him"
outside of his exit from the house.191 Officer Fackrell stopped Strieff in a
7-Eleven convenience store parking lot after Strieff had walked about a
block from the home.'9 2 The officer identified himself and explained, "I
had been watching the house and that I believed there might be drug
activity there and asked him if he would tell me what he was doing
there."'93 Officer Fackrell could not remember Strieff's response.194
Officer Fackrell then asked Strieff for his identification because he
wanted "to know who I'm talking to."'95 When Strieff gave him his Utah
identification card, the officer had the dispatcher run a warrants check,
184. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016); Brief for Petitioner at 2, Utah v. Strieff,
136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373).
185. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184; Brief for Respondent at
13, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373).
186. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184; Brief for Respondent,
supra note 185, at 14.
187. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 13-14.
188. Id. at 14.
189. Id
190. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184.
191. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
192. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184.




which revealed an outstanding "minor traffic warrant."'96 On the strength
of this information, Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff and then searched him
incident to the arrest.1 97  As a result of the search, the officer found
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in his pocket.198
The State charged Strieff with "unlawful possession of
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia."199 The trial court denied
Strieff's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal
seizure of his person, prompting the defendant to enter a conditional guilty
plea and reserve the right to appeal.200
B. The Court's Opinion in Strieff
The Strieff Court framed the issue in its case as "how the attenuation
doctrine applies where an unconstitutional detention leads to the discovery
of a valid arrest warrant."20' The Court held, "The evidence the officer
seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the
officer's discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between
the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest."202 The Court
noted that, historically, officers who violated the Fourth Amendment were
"traditionally considered trespassers" who could be sued civilly by their
victims.203 The Court cautioned that only later did the Court adopt the
exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations, and then only allowed
it to apply when "its deterrence benefits outweighe[d] its substantial
costs."204
The Court pointed out that the exclusionary rule had its exceptions,
including "the attenuation doctrine," which allowed admission of illegally
obtained evidence when the connection between the constitutional violation
and the evidence was "remote or has been interrupted by some intervening
196. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016); Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at
15.
197. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
198. Id. The drug paraphernalia was a "glass drug pipe and a small plastic scale with white
residue." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184, at 3.
199. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
200. Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 15.
201. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2060. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Strieff Court offered a more
detailed version of the issue in the case, asking whether the Court's "attenuation doctrine applies
when an officer makes an unconstitutional investigatory stop; learns during that stop that the
suspect is subject to a valid arrest warrant; and proceeds to arrest the suspect and seize
incriminating evidence during a search incident to arrest." Id. at 2059.
202. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
203. Id. at 2060-61.
204. Id. at 2061.
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circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee
that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence
obtained."'205 The Strieff Court then applied Brown's attenuation factors to
determine "whether the discovery of a valid arrest warrant was a sufficient
intervening event to break the causal chain between the unlawful stop and
the discovery of the drug-related evidence on Strieff's person."206
Strieff readily noted that Brown's first factor, "temporal proximity"
between the illegality and the search for the evidence,207 supported
suppression in its case.208 The time, which elapsed between the unlawful
stop of Strieff and the search incident to arrest, was only a matter of
minutes-too short to constitute the "substantial time" needed to cleanse
taint.209 The government's prospects improved when the Court proceeded
to Brown's second factor, "intervening circumstances," which "strongly
favor[ed] the State."210 The Court identified this intervening event as the
arrest warrant, which was not only "valid," but also "predated" and
"entirely unconnected" with the illegal stop.211
The Court in Strieff spent most of its focus on Brown's third element,
"the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," which it found
"strongly favor[ed] the State."2 12 The Court reiterated that, since evidence
should be suppressed "only when the police misconduct is most in need of
deterrence," exclusion should be restricted to official behavior that "is
purposeful or flagrant."2 13  Such severe misconduct was missing from
Strieff, as Officer Fackrell simply made "two good-faith mistakes."2 14 The
officer committed his first error when, failing to see when Strieff entered
the house, he stopped Strieff-even though he lacked the basis to conclude




207. In Brown, the case that created the multifactored test, the first factor listed was whether
police gave the arrestee Miranda warnings. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975). Unlike
Brown, the Strieff Court made no mention of this factor, so its "first factor" was "temporal
proximity." Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
208. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (20.16).
209. Id.
210. Id. To bolster this conclusion, the Court relied on Segura v. United States, which was a
case involving the distinct exclusionary rule exception, independent source. Segura v. United
States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984).
211. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062.
212. Id. at 2063.
213. Id.
214. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
215. Id.
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Since he lacked sufficient justification for seizing Strieff, Officer Fackrell
made his second mistake by demanding that Strieff speak with him, rather
than request he do so. 2 16 The Court dismissed these violations as mere
"errors in judgment" which hardly rose to "purposeful or flagrant"
violations of the Fourth Amendment.217 Officer Fackrell's further intrusion
of running a warrant check was only a "negligibly burdensome" precaution,
and all of his further actions were "lawful." 218 Instead of dealing with a
matter rife with "systemic or recurrent police misconduct," the Strieff case
involved an "isolated instance of negligence" in an otherwise "bona fide
investigation."219  After weighing Brown's factors, the Strieff Court
concluded, "the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible
because the illegal stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing
arrest warrant."220
III. Implications of Strieff's Rationales
A. In Emphasizing Lawful Police Conduct in an Effort to Minimize a
Fourth Amendment Violation, Strieff Weakened the Exclusionary
Rule
In the first sentence of its opinion, before even presenting the issue in
the case, the Strieff Court took the trouble to weaken the exclusionary rule
by noting that it was only used to vindicate violated Fourth Amendment
rights "at times."22 1 This was not the Court's only gambit to erode the
exclusionary rule, for the Court later mentioned that the Fourth
Amendment was "historically enforced" through "torts suits or self-
help."222 The Court highlighted the rule's recent origin by emphasizing
that it had only become the "principal judicial remedy" in the "[twentieth]
century."223 The Court then identified the exclusionary rule's "significant
costs" and "substantial social costs" without making any mention of any
224possible benefits. The Court then concluded, "Suppression of





220. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
221. Id at 2059.
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repeatedly negative characterizations of the exclusionary rule-beginning
even before the reader learned the question in the case-ate away at the
vitality of this mandate before it was even applied to the facts.
Further, in its quest to avoid suppressing evidence, the Court in Strieff
repeatedly emphasized all of the lawful aspects of Officer Fackrell's
behavior, despite the illegality that triggered the case.226 The Court noted
that the arrest warrant was "valid," "pre-existing," and "predated Officer
Fackrell's investigation."22 7 The warrant was "wholly independent of the
illegal stop" and "entirely unconnected with the stop."228 The Court took
care to note that Officer Fackrell's conduct after his violation "was lawful,"
and it was "undisputedly lawful to search Strieff as an incident of his
arrest."229  The officer's choice to run the warrant check was only
"negligibly burdensome" to Strieff, and Fackrell only made "two good-
faith mistakes."2 30 The Court characterized the constitutional violation as
"an isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona
fide investigation."23' The entire thrust of Strieff's curious argument here
was that officers could somehow bank an earthly form of karma or extra
credit to immunize themselves from a violation they later commit or have
committed in the past. If an officer performs enough lawful acts before and
after performing an unreasonable seizure of a person, such good acts will
smother the violation out of existence. The problem with this contention is
that it fails to account for the fact that the Constitution does not work that
way. Peace officers, as government actors serving the public, are forever
held to a constitutional minimum regardless of all the good they do.
Another problem with the Strieff Court's focus on lawful conduct was
its tendency to obscure Officer Fackrell's unlawful actions. As noted by
Justice Kagan, the officer's illegal seizure was a "far cry from a Barney
Fife-type mishap."232 The officer's "calculated" decision to illegally stop
Strieff was "taken with so little justification that the State has never tried to
defend its legality."233 The officer stopped Strieff not to bring a criminal to




230. Id. at 2063.
231. Id.
232. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2072 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
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book but to "fish for evidence"234 in "the hope that something might turn
up." 23 5
Officer Fackrell then compounded the intrusion by having Strieff wait
while he ran a warrant check on him.236 Rodriguez v. United States-a case
decided in the same term as Strieff-reveals Officer Fackrell's exacerbation
of his original Fourth Amendment violation here.237 In Rodriguez, a police
officer pulled Rodriguez's vehicle over for veering onto a shoulder in
violation of Nebraska's traffic laws.238 After issuing Rodriguez a warning
ticket and thus taking care of "all of the business" of the stop, the officer
had a police dog sniff the car for drugs, despite the driver's explicit refusal
of consent to do so.2 39 When the canine was alerted, the police searched
the vehicle and eventually recovered a bag of methamphetamine. The
Eighth Circuit deemed this "seven or eight-minute delay" permissible.240
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "a police stop exceeding the
time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the
Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures."241 The Court broke
the officer's actions down into its two parts: (1) the investigation and
resolution of the traffic infraction; and (2) the canine sniff.24 2 The Court
then ruled that the seizure's duration could "last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate" the purpose of the stop.24 3 Since a warrant check serves the
same purpose as the initial stop, enforcing the traffic code by ensuring the
violator is not wanted for other traffic offenses is a proper part of the
seizure.244 The dog sniff, in contrast, was not aimed at ensuring traffic
safety; instead, it was focused on finding evidence for "ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."245 The extra time spent for the canine sniff, however brief,
violated the Fourth Amendment because it extended the seizure of a citizen
234. Id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
236. "The officer deepens the breach when he prolongs the detention just to fish further for
evidence of wrongdoing. In his search for lawbreaking, the officer in this case himself broke the
law." Id at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see Rodriguez v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615-16 (2016).
237. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1609.
238. Id. at 1612-13.
239. Id. at 1613.
240. Id. at 1614.
241. Id at 1612.
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246
beyond the time needed to deal with the traffic violation. The Court in
Rodriguez turned a deaf ear to the argument that the delay was de minimis
because any prolongation of the stop, no matter of how little duration,
beyond its proper purpose was unlawful.247
The Strieff Court, in its mission to diminish the illegality of Officer
Fackrell's seizure, ignored its own ruling in Rodriguez.248 As in Rodriguez,
the stop in Strieff had two parts: (1) Officer Fackrell's stop of Strieff "to
ask somebody" about "what was going on [in] the house";249 and (2) the
officer's switch of tasks to Strieff's own possible criminal record.250 Even
though the Court deemed the arrest warrant "entirely unconnected to the
stop," it never addressed the Rodriguez Court's holding, prohibiting a
seizure's extension to perform such activity, "unconnected" as it was from
the initial purpose of the stop.251 Instead, the Strieff Court's pursued the
"de minimis" argument,252 which the Court in Rodriguez had explicitly
rejected by minimizing the extra time Officer Fackrell took to pursue a
warrant check as a "negligibly burdensome precaution[]."2 53
Finally, in its effort to cleanse the evidence in Strieff the Court
declared the officer's search incident to arrest to be "undisputedly
lawful." 254 This search, of course, was only lawful if it was not tainted by
the illegal stop that preceded it. The Court thus employed a conclusion it
hoped for-a search cleansed of the taint from an illegal stop as one of the
intervening factors used to purge the taint in the first place.255  Since a
search incident to arrest relies solely on the lawfulness of the arrest itself,
the search can only be deemed lawful when it is clearly established that the
arrest justifying it is lawful.256  The Strieff Court turned a blind eye to
246. Id. at 1614.
247. Id. at 1616.
248. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016).
249. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
250. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2060.
251. Id at 2062.
252. Id. at 2063.
253. Id.; Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2016).
254. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
255. Id. at 2062-63.
256. In United States v. Robinson, the Court ruled,
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on
what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person
of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.
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Officer Fackrell's exploitation of his original illegal stop to run the warrant,
which justified the arrest that allowed the search incident to the arrest.
However, acknowledgment of this chain of events would cause the Court's
search incident to arrest claims to unravel.257  With such mental
contortions, the Strieff Court strained to cleanse the taint to avoid a result it
dreaded: The exclusion of evidence.258
B. Strieff Applied an Attenuation Rule that Was Not Designed for
Physical Evidence and, Therefore, Failed to Adequately Address the
Taint in Its Case
The Court in Strieff hobbled its own attenuation analysis by
improperly applying Brown's factors to Officer Fackrell's recovery of
methamphetamine. In her dissent, Justice Kagan explained how the Court
struck out in applying Brown's three factors of "temporal proximity,"
"purposeful and flagrant police misconduct," and "intervening
circumstances."25 9 The Court suffered "strike one," as it acknowledged,
when the time lapse between the illegal stop and the discovery of the drugs
was only a matter of minutes, far too short to fulfill the Brown Court's
"substantial time" requirement.260 "Strike two" occurred when the officer
admitted his purposefulness by stating he only stopped Strieff to learn what
was going on in the home under surveillance.261 Finally, the Court
committed "strike three" in labeling the warrant an intervening event
because outstanding warrants are so "run-of-the-mill" that they hardly
"appear as bolts from the blue."262
In applying Brown to Strieff's stop, all of the justices, whether in the
majority or in dissent, assumed this case provided the rule best able to
decide the issue. A closer analysis of Wong Sun, Brown, and the later cases
applying Brown's factors, however, reveal that the justices' assumptions in
Strieff might have been unwarranted. In Wong Sun, the evidence subjected
to the attenuation analysis was either verbal statements from arrestees or
263
physical items obtained in reliance on such statements. Specifically, the
Court in Wong Sun considered the admissibility of James Toy's statement
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
257. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2065; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
258. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061.
259. Id. at 2071-72 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor also determined that the
Court improperly applied the Brown Court's three attenuation factors. Id. at 2066 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
260. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2072 (2016).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 2073.
263. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 474, 491 (1963).
418 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 44:4
Summer 20171 ERODING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN UTAH V STRIEFF
given in his bedroom, the heroin obtained from Johnny Yee that police
learned of due to James Toy's statement, and Wong Sun's statement
sometime after his illegal arrest.264 In deciding Toy's statement was not
cleansed by any "intervening event," the Court explored the psychological
impact of the agents' illegal actions:
Six or seven officers had broken the door and followed on
Toy's heels into the bedroom where his wife and child
were sleeping. He had been almost immediately
handcuffed and arrested. Under such circumstances it is
unreasonable to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently
an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the
265unlawful invasion.
The Court explored Toy's mind by surmising, "It is probable that even
today .. . there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions
put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for you if you
do not." 266  Similarly, the Court placed Wong Sun on the couch when
weighing whether his statement was tainted. Since police released Wong
Sun "on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment," and he himself
had "returned voluntarily several days later" to speak with police, his
statement was free of the coercive psychological atmosphere that
267
surrounded Toy's situation.
As in Wong Sun, the cases applying Brown's attenuation factors
explored the emotional impact an illegal seizure had on later statements.268
In Brown, the suspect provided two statements after police pointed guns at
his front and back during an illegal arrest.269 The Court, venturing into the
realm of "free will," despaired at the complexity of "the human mind."
270
The Brown Court also noted the officers performed their illegal arrest in a
manner "calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion."
271
264. Id. at 484, 491.
265. Id at 486.
266. Id. at 486, n.12.
267. Id. at 491.
268. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592, 594-95 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 203 (1979); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 101 (1980); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S.
687, 689, 691 (1982); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 628-29 (2003).
269. Brown, 422 U.S. at 590, 592, 594-95.
270. Id. at 603.
271. Id. at 605. The Dunaway Court also considered, however briefly, mental factors when
assessing the taint of an arrestee's confession. In this matter, the Court found no "intervening
event of significance." Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218.
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The Court in Rawlings, where officers would not allow visitors of an
apartment to leave without a body search, went further in examining the
psychological impact of an illegal seizure.272 There, the Court focused on
the emotional setting surrounding Rawlings' admission about owning drugs
when analyzing the "temporal proximity of the arrest and the
confession.",273 Rather than just noting the time length between seizure and
confession, the Court in Rawlings examined "the precise conditions under
which the occupants" were detained.274 At the start of the detention, the
visitors could move freely about the home.275 One of the detainees, Dennis
Sadler, helped himself to a cup of coffee, joked with the police about the
puppy on the premises, and offered the officers beverages.276 In this
"congenial atmosphere," Sadler even turned on some music.277 Such a
relaxed and friendly setting indicated little chance of continuing mental
harm stemming from the illegal detention, even though a "relatively short
period of time" had elapsed from its commission.278 Psychology also
dominated the Court's consideration of Brown's next factor, "intervening
circumstances."279 Rawlings' admission, rather than being a product of his
illegal seizure, stemmed from his own "spontaneous reaction" to the
discovery of the drugs and his own motives for claiming them.280 Aware
that his fellow visitor, Cox, was "freaking out," Rawlings demonstrated
conflicting "motivations."281 Rawlings both wished to spare Cox blame
("[H]e wasn't going to try to pin that on her."), and feared she would
incriminate them further ("[H]is main concern was whether or not Vanessa
Cox was going to say anything[]").2 82 This penetrating analysis of the most
minute mental motivations were all to ensure that Rawlings' statements
were "acts of free will unaffected by any illegality in the initial
detention."283
The Court in Taylor also emphasized the link between a detainee's
confession and his psyche. The State, understanding the centrality of the
272. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 100.
273. Id. at 107.
274. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980).





280. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108-09 (1980).
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mental experience, urged that the six hours between the illegal arrest and
Taylor's statements gave him "every opportunity to consider his situation,
to organize his thoughts, to contemplate his constitutional rights, and to
exercise his free will." 28 Unlike the prosecution, the Court doubted
whether the five to ten minute visit could have contributed to careful and
objective judgment.285  Instead, the girlfriend's upset nature might have
inflamed Taylor's own emotions, since after seeing her, he immediately
recanted his ignorance about the robbery and signed his confession.28 6 This
probing exploration of Taylor's inner mental state had only one aim: to
determine that his confession was "the fruit of his illegal arrest."287
In contrast to Wong Sun and the Brown line of cases, the evidence
subject to attenuation in Strieff was not a confession or an item found
because of a confession, but methamphetamine, a drug pipe, and a plastic
scale.288 Since Officer Fackrell based his search incident to arrest on a
"minor traffic warrant,"289 he had no need to rely on any statement from
Strieff. Indeed, it is arguable that the officer paid little heed to Strieff's
words, for he could not even remember Strieff's response to his question
about the activity in the house.290 Lacking any reason to assess the effect of
an illegal seizure on a resulting statement, the Strieff Court did not need to
delve into the psychological impact of the Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court's ruling in Wong Sun that a statement must not only be voluntary
under the Fifth Amendment, but also be guided by free will, clear of taint,
284. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 691-92.
287. Id. at 694. The Harris Court also used the Brown Court's factors to study the link
between police "control of the defendant's person" and his "challenged statement." New York v.
Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990). Since the police in Harris had formed probable cause before
arresting Harris, they did not exploit their unlawful warrantless entry into his home to in order to
continue to hold him in custody as he sat in the station. Id. Unlike in other attenuation cases, the
officers in Harris did not take advantage of their original illegality (invading the "sanctity of the
home") to obtain the statement. Id at 17. While Harris was being questioned at the station,
police pulled no emotional levers about the privacy of his home to get him to speak. Id The
Harris Court therefore reasoned that its case differed from Brown and its progeny because those
cases involved evidence that was, "in some sense[,] the product of illegal governmental activity."
Id at 19. The Court in Kaupp also relied on the emotional impact of official behavior on the
arrestee's decision to confess. Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 633 (2003). In assessing the
existence of taint, the Court noted that the fact that Kaupp "remained in his partially clothed state
in the physical custody of a number of officers," was hardly a situation conducive to clear
thinking. Id
288. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184, at 3.
289. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016); Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at
15.
290. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
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simply had no application in Strieff29 1 Instead, the Strieff Court could have
simply focused on the Wong Sun Court's true inquiry: Whether the
evidence had been obtained by exploitation of illegality "or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 29 2
An attenuation rule recognizing the distinction between confessions
and physical evidence would considerably limit Brown's impact because
some of its factors were designed or applied to analyze the effect of
illegality on confessions. The applicability to confessions of Brown's first
factor, Miranda warnings, is self-evident in light of their purpose in
shielding a suspect from the inherently coercive pressures to confess during
293custodial interrogation. Brown's second factor, "temporal proximity of
the arrest and the confession," not only explicitly references a confession,
but also, as seen in Taylor, has been applied to analyze the emotional
impact of the violation on the resulting confession.294 The Rawlings Court
applied Brown's third factor, "intervening circumstances," by assessing its
impact on a confession admitting drug possession.295 Brown applied its
fourth factor, "the purpose and flagrancy of conduct," to assess a
confession.296 As support for its consideration of official flagrancy and
purposefulness, the Brown Court cited three lower court cases: United
States v. Edmons, United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, and United States
v. Kilgen.297  While Edmons involved an arrest to place a suspect in a
291. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963).
292. Id. at 487. To say that the taint analysis for confessions and physical evidence can
differ, is not to say that one or the other kind of evidence falls outside the exclusionary rule. The
Court, in United States v. Crews, clearly indicated that all kinds of evidence could be suppressed,
specifically noting:
[T]he exclusionary sanction applies to any "fruits" of a constitutional
violation-whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually
seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course
of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused
obtained during an illegal arrest and detention.
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980). However, the fact that the exclusionary rule
applies to both physical evidence and confessions does not necessarily mean that the attenuation
analysis for exclusion needs to apply in the same way to these different kinds of evidence.
293. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 592, 603 (1975); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
294. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982).
295. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 109 (1980).
296. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604.
297. Id. at 604, 604, n. 9; United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (1970); United States
ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 450 F.2d 232, 236 (1971); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287, 289
(1971). The Brown Court also referred its readers to Wong Sun, where the Court offered, "The
petitioner has never suggested any impropriety in the interrogation itself which would require the
exclusion of this statement." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963). This is
hardly a rock-solid foundation for Brown 's fourth factor.
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lineup, the other two concerned arrests for confessions.298 No officers in
any of these cases had, as the goal of their arrest, the collecting of physical
evidence .299
Some of Brown's factors lose relevance when applied to a physical
item. The Court in Strieff implicitly recognized as much when it skipped
over Brown's "Miranda warnings" factor without mention and labeled
"temporal proximity" as its first factor to consider.30 When faced with an
attenuation issue regarding physical evidence rather than a confession, the
Strieff Court should abandon the Brown Court's holding in favor of a
straightforward proximate cause rule based on reasonable foreseeability. In
such an analysis, the Court would simply inquire whether a reasonable
officer, in the particular officer's situation, could reasonably foresee that
illegal conduct could result in the recovery of incriminating evidence. In
this streamlined attenuation rule, "temporal proximity" and "intervening
events" would be assessed only in regard to whether such factors increased
or decreased the foreseeable likelihood of obtaining evidence. Brown's
factors would be dropped, due either to their irrelevancy or their
problematic impact on the Exclusionary Rule Doctrine.3 0'
A simple rule of proximate cause based on foreseeability possesses
several advantages for Fourth Amendment litigation. First, this rule is
hardly a wrenching break from precedent, as shown by Justice Kagan's
explanation that "Fourth Amendment attenuation analysis 'looks to
whether the constitutional violation was the proximate cause of the
discovery of the evidence."'302 In the guise of intervening circumstances,
proximate cause is well known to the courts, which have long applied this
concept in tort law.303 Second, a focus on reasonable foreseeability steers
clear of the kind of "rigid" or "specific" test that the Court has previously
refused, in Illinois v. Gates, to force upon police.304 In Gates, the Court
preferred a definition of probable cause that avoided the "library analysis
by scholars" in favor of rule understandable to "those versed in the field of
298. United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (1970); United States v. ex rel. Gockley v.
Myers, 450 F.2d 232 (1971); United States v. Kilgen, 445 F.2d 287 (1971).
299. Id.
300. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016).
301. As previously noted, the Strieff Court, itself, already jettisoned the Brown Court's
Miranda warnings factor without comment. Id. A full analysis of the suggestion to rid
attenuation of the purpose and flagrancy factor is addressed in Part IV(B) below.
302. Strieff 136 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
303. Id.
304. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). In Gates, the Court favored a "totality-of-
the-circumstances" test for probable cause over the prior "rigid" and "specific" Aguillar/Spinelli
test it replaced. Id.
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law enforcement."305 The Court saw the nontechnical aspect of its probable
cause rule as strength because it would be used by "nonlawyer" officers in
the field who often worked in haste.3%6 Likewise, the simplified reasonably
foreseeable test could be properly applied based on "common-sense
judgments of laymen" making quick decisions during rapidly unfolding
situations on the street.307 Third, analyzing reasonable foreseeability would
give the attenuation analysis a textual anchor in the Fourth Amendment, for
the first clause of the Fourth Amendment involves reasonableness.308
Finally, a proximate cause rule for physical evidence would return the
Court to Wong Sun's "proper inquiry": Whether police had exploited their
own illegality obtaining the evidence.30 9 If an officer took advantage of his
or her own unlawful behavior to gain evidence, then the evidence would be
so intimately linked to the illegality that it cannot be said to be "remote."310
Therefore, the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment would be
served by suppression of such evidence.3 11
Officer Fackrell's conduct provides a prime example of official
exploitation of illegality. Rather than dedicating himself to a prolonged
stakeout, the officer made sporadic visits over a week that in their entirety
added up to only three hours.312  He saw some "short-term visits"
infrequently occur at the home, some ambiguous evidence that raised his
suspicion that drugs sales were occurring at the house.313 Even though a
reasonable officer possessing Officer Fackrell's eighteen years of
experience would know better, the officer decided to seize "the next person
he saw leaving the house."314 The Court reluctantly recognized Fackrell's
negligence and the officer himself admitted that the stop was based on
nothing more than the desire to ask "somebody" about "what was going
on" in the residence.316 Edward Strieff just happened to be that somebody.
305. Id. at 232.
306. Id. at 231, 235.
307. Id. at 236.
308. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
309. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
310. The Court in Strieff explained that evidence becomes attenuated when it "is remote or
has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that 'the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the
evidence obtained."' Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 2059; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184, at 2.
313. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 184, at 2; Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
314. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 13-14.
315. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
316. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
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Officer Fackrell admitted that Stieff had "done nothing to arouse any
suspicion that he was committing a crime" other than leave the home.3 17
The illegality of Officer Fackrell's "calculated decision" to stop Strieff was
so clear that the State never even attempted to "defend its legality."318 This
"gratuitous and avoidable" misconduct is "precisely the type of behavior
most in need of deterrence."3 19
Thus, Officer Fackrell intentionally committed the stop-despite the
fact that an objectively reasonable eighteen-year veteran with his
specialized drug enforcement experience would know better-in order to
obtain evidence.320  The result of the officer's illegality was not only
foreseeable, but the very goal of his unlawful act-the recovery of
evidence. The evidentiary prize, however, did not come from inside the
home, as the officer originally intended, but from Strieff's own person.
Still, finding evidence in Strieff's pocket was itself a foreseeable
consequence of the illegal stop due to Officer Fackrell's "standard
practice."321 The officer explained that he routinely sought identification at
stops because, "of course it's normal for me to want to know who I am
talking to so I told him that, you know, if he had some [identification] if I
could please see it." 322  The existence of an outstanding warrant was
foreseeable; indeed, by the officer's own admission, that possibility was the
very purpose for running the check in the first place. Officer Fackrell
therefore exploited his illegal stop by getting the name and identification of
Strieff for a warrant check, something he could not have gained in any
practical manner without first illegally stopping him.
The fact that the officer could not remember Strieff's response to his
question presented a red flag.323 If Strieff had provided Officer Fackrell
with anything that added to his suspicions about the house, then the officer
would likely have been able to remember it for such a tip would enable him
to pursue his original target, the drug dealers inside the residence. A
forgettable response would probably be an answer so innocuous that it
failed to help the officer in advancing his investigation. When presented
317. Id. If one were to give police and citizens equal treatment, then the Strieff Court's
rationale that an officer's lawful conduct mitigates the illegality it surrounds should apply equally
to Strieffs own actions. Then, by the Court's strained logic, Strieff's lawful behavior should
lessen the significance of the fact he exited a suspicious home. See Part IV(A).
318. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2072 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
319. Jarvis v. United States, 435 U.S. 934, 937 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
320. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
321. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
322. Id. Officer Fackrell thus exacerbated the initial illegality of his stop by prolonging it
with a warrant check. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615-16 (2016).
323. Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at 14.
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with no additional incriminating evidence, Officer Fackrell did not let
Strieff go, but pursued a second fishing expedition by checking for a
warrant. The officer only ceased when he had obtained evidence; this
strongly suggests that gaining evidence was not only foreseeable, but the
ultimate goal of the entire inquiry.
C. By Emphasizing Purposefulness and Flagrancy, Strieff Set an
Alarmingly Low Bar as Its New Standard for Lawful Policing
In applying the Brown Court's "flagrancy" factor to its case, the Strieff
Court made much of Officer Fackrell's "good faith" in being "at most
negligent."324 The Strieff Court justified its focus on flagrancy by arguing
that since the exclusionary rule's purpose is "to deter police misconduct," it
should be used "only when the police misconduct is most in need of
deterrence-that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant."325 The idea that
police negligence is immune to the exclusionary rule does not square with
logic. Justice Sotomayor noted that the "officers prone to negligence" are
the very officials in "the most need" of learning the lessons that exclusion
forcibly teaches.326 Since these individuals are not the hardened or cynical
rule breakers, exclusion might be most effective on changing their motives
to "err on the side of constitutional behavior."3 27 Common sense would
suggest that the best way to promote good conduct is to nip problems in the
bud rather than waiting until they progress to being committed purposefully
or flagrantly. Even the early opponents to the exclusionary rule understood
that it applied to constitutional violations without consideration of purpose
and flagrancy. When Judge Cardozo famously complained "[t]he criminal
is to go free because the constable has blundered," he understood that
evidence would be suppressed when officers made a mistake.328 In
response to Judge Cardozo's lament, the Court in Mapp did not limit its
new rule to only the most egregious behavior, but frankly gave the reason
for suffering it instead: taking the "ignoble shortcut to conviction" by
admitting illegally obtained evidence "tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest."329
Further, the Court's assumption that deterrence works best when
limited to only the most egregious and intentional conduct lacks an
empirical basis. Scholars have long recognized that "[c]ompliance with
324. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926).
329. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The
expected penalty depends on both the probability of punishment and the
severity of the punishment if caught."330
The general theory of deterrence postulates, "increases in variables
such as the probability of detection and conviction, along with increases in
the penalty (either fines or jail terms) tend to reduce crime rates."331
Traditionally, it was understood that "increases in the probability of
punishment have a larger and more significant impact than increases in the
severity of punishment."332 Although the greater impact of probability of
punishment over its severity has been the subject of recent debate, the
consensus eems to be that both factors have some impact on deterrence.33 3
Since certainty of punishment is an important, if not the leading, factor
in deterrence, the exclusionary rule's effectiveness would be improved by
promoting its certainty of application to police misconduct. The Court's
tendency to carve out exceptions to the exclusionary rule limits the
certainty of its application and, therefore, undermines its deterrence
value.334 The Strieff Court's restriction of exclusion to only purposeful and
flagrant constitutional violations dramatically limits the frequency and,
thus, the certainty of evidence suppression. Moreover, because recent
research indicates the importance of a punishment's severity for deterrence,
the Strieff Court's complaints about exclusion's "significant costs" might
actually prove the rule's efficacy.335 In Hudson v. Michigan, the Court
accurately noted that the costs of exclusion "sometimes include setting the
330. See Lana Friesen, Certainty of Punishment Versus Severity of Punishment: An
Experimental Investigation, S. ECON. J., 399 (2012); see also Murat C. Mungan, The Certainty
Versus the Severity of Punishment, Repeat Offenders, and Stigmatization, ECON. LETTERS, 1, 126
(2017) ("A belief shared by many criminologists is that the certainty of punishment (p) affects
deterrence more than the severity of punishment (s), and there is some empirical evidence
supporting this belief").
331. Friesen, supra note 330, at 400.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 416 ("The main conclusion of this article is that an increase in the severity of
punishment is a more effective deterrent than an equivalent increase in the probability of
punishment."); see also Mungan, supra note 330.
334. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule
does not apply to evidence at grand jury proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)
(explaining that when a defendant has received a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth
Amendment claim in state court, his claim to exclude evidence will not be heard on habeas
corpus); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (holding that evidence will not be
excluded when an officer has relied in objective good faith on a warrant issued by a detached and
neutral magistrate); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (holding that use of
illegally obtained evidence can be used to properly impeach defendant).
335. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
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guilty free and the dangerous at large."336 The Hudson Court also rightly
worried that evidence suppression exerts a "costly toll" on the courts'
central purpose of seeking truth.3  The Court in United States v. Leon
labeled the fact that the guilty might go free or receive reduced sentencing
as an "objectionable collateral consequence" of the exclusionary rule's
"interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function."338
What the Court misses when bemoaning such results is that they are not a
bug but rather a feature of the exclusionary rule. Exclusion is certainly
costly, indeed it is meant to be so. The Mapp Court explained that a key
purpose of excluding evidence was deterrence through punishment, to
"deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." 339
The Court in Mapp recognized that, in applying the exclusionary rule to all
state officials, it was committing itself to an endeavor with the highest of
stakes.34 0 The Court stated, "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence."341
When the exclusionary rule's costs are visited upon the individual
officer, he or she will suffer in a personal and pragmatic way. Lost cases
due to exclusion of evidence, particularly if they continue to occur, could
cause individual upset, loss of professional reputation, and even damage to
career prospects. Patterns of failure reflect poorly on leadership, which feel
the pressure to discipline or at the very least educate.3 42  The Court
recognized this dynamic in Stone v. Powell, in noting that the exclusionary
336. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
337. Id.
338. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 (1984).
339. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
340. Id. at 659.
341. Id.
342. The Court, in Hudson v. Michigan, noted the following improvement in policing:
Another development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights
violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces, including a new
emphasis on internal police discipline. Even as long ago as 1980 we felt it
proper to "assume" that unlawful police behavior would "be dealt with
appropriately" by the authorities, but we now have increasing evidence that
police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of
citizens seriously. There have been "wide-ranging reforms in the education,
training, and supervision of police officers."
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598-99 (2006) (internal citations omitted). The Court offered
this observation as justification for limiting the exclusionary rule, unaware that such increased
police professionalism was likely due to the very exclusionary rule it was currently limiting. Id.
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rule was meant to prevent "unlawful police activity in part through the
nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values."343  Without the
exclusionary rule's practical consequences, "lawless police" would
hypocritically pursue lawless civilians.344 As Justice Brandeis declared
nearly eight decades ago, "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
are commands to the citizen."345 He further warned, "Crime is contagious.
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."346
It is curious that, at a time of increasing violence and distrust between
347
police and citizenry-where police wear body cameras and citizens
record traffic stops with their cell phones348-the Court would limit its
enforcement of Fourth Amendment rights to only flagrant or purposeful
violations.349  If police fail to follow the law, or even if there is only a
general perception that officers are law violators, it is the officer on the
street who suffers.350  The Court should thus use care when limiting
enforcement of a basic constitutional right.
D. Strieff Destroyed Incentives to Avoid Illegal Seizures by Providing
Police with a Per Se Rule for Automatically Cleansing Taint
In creating its attenuation factors, the Brown Court explicitly refused
to consider the reading of Miranda after an illegal arrest as alone sufficient
to cleanse taint.351 Such a per se rule would encourage police to violate the
Fourth Amendment secure in the knowledge that any evidence obtained as
343. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976).
344. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
345. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
346. Id.
347. William Lee, Police Body Cameras to Be Implemented Citywide a Year Early:
Officials, CHI. TRIB., (Dec. 28, 2016, 6:04 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/locau
breaking/ct-body-cameras-chicago-police-20161228-story.html.
348. CBS SF Bay Area, Minnesota Man Fatally Shot by Police; Aftermath Posted on
Facebook, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aOgqXklCAck ("These
days, when people see anything, their reflex action is to pull out the cell phone to start
recording."); ABC News, Live Police Shooting of Philando Castile I Livestream Video
[GRAPHIC CONTENT], YOUTUBE (July 7, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ja
B8MJhncDc.
349. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016).
350. Faith Karimi et al., Dallas Sniper Attack: 5 Officers Killed, Suspect Identified, CNN, (July
9, 2016, 1:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling-protests/.
351. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975). This Article, in Part IV(B) above,
suggests the Court abandon the Brown Court's factors when assessing attenuation of taint for
physical items. If the Court, however, adheres to the Brown decision, it should consistently
follow all implications of this rule.
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a result of the violation "could well be made admissible at trial by the
simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings."352 The Court in Brown
declared, "Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be
eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a 'cure-all,' and the
constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be
said to be reduced to 'a form of words."'
353
What the Court wisely forbade in 1975, it recklessly allowed in 2016.
In Strieff the Court embraced the cure-all of the unknown warrant; instead
of having the expedient of the Miranda warnings, the Strieff Court gave
police the expedient of an outstanding arrest warrant.3 54 After Strieff
police who have no reason to seize a citizen can do so with the bare hope
that a warrant in the system will clean up their Fourth Amendment mess. If
a check reveals a warrant, the unlawful stop is erased; if the check shows
no warrant exists, the officer can just let the person leave. The only person
who suffered a cost-whether in time, dignity, or peace of mind-is the
hapless citizen. With Strieff, officers who have nothing (no objective
suspicion) will lose nothing (no exclusion of evidence) if they violate the
Constitution. However, these same officers, similar to gamblers pulling the
arm of a slot machine, might gain something on the off chance that a
warrant exists when they pull the person aside.
In actuality, the officers pursuing these stops will be participating less
in gambling than in a sure thing. Justice Sotomayor noted, "Outstanding
warrants," whether for such relatively minor matters as traffic tickets or for
probationers breaking curfew, are "surprisingly common."3 55 State and
federal government databases, which list "7.8 million outstanding
warrants," might still be failing to account for the "'staggering' numbers of
warrants, 'drawers and drawers' full, that many cities issue for traffic
violations and ordinance infractions."356 The danger of police abusing their
ability to instantly cleanse an illegal stop with an outstanding warrant is not
just real but ongoing. A justice department analysis of warrant-checked
stops, mentioned by Justice Sotomayor, reported that "approximately
[ninety-three percent] of the stops would have been considered unsupported
by articulated reasonable suspicion."3
352. Id at 602.
353. Id at 602-03.
354. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016).
355. Id at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
356. Id
357. Id at 2069.
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Conclusion
Justice Kagan's reference to Barney Fife in her dissent had
significance beyond the Court's "purposefulness" inquiry.5 In one
episode of the venerable television series, Andy Griffith, Barney Fife tickets
a car for illegal parking, only to learn that it is the governor's limousine.359
Instead of having Deputy Fife humiliated or fired, the governor visits
Barney to shake his hand. The moral underlying the episode respects the
rule of law; the law is so important, that no one, not even the governor, can
flout it. This simple and compelling lesson has been lost on the Strieff
Court. In Andy Griffith's world, even a governor has to face the
consequences of even the most trivial illegality. In Strieff, an officer can
avoid accountability for violating the supreme law of the land360 if his
quarry happened to have an unknown and unresolved traffic violation.6
Such condoning of "lawless police conduct" in pursuit of "lawless civilian
conduct" violates "a basic principle that lies at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment."362
Further, vintage television highlights the concern caused by the Strieff
Court's acceptance of any officer illegality falling short of being
"purposeful and flagrant."3 63 In 1980s television show, Hill Street Blues, a
crusty sergeant would habitually end his roll calls by imploring his officers,
"Let's be careful out there!" 364 If the Strieff Court were to write a script to
bring back the television series, its morning roll calls would end with the
sergeant perverting the standard admonition to, "Let's be careless out there!
Just avoid being purposeful or flagrant!" The break the Strieff Court gave
to negligent officers will serve only to weaken the competence and
professionalism of our police forces in times when adroit policing is all the
more needed.
358. Id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
359. Barney Fife Did It Right, (July 28, 2013), TIMES-REPUBLICAN, http://www.times
republican.com/opinion/your-view/2013/07/barney-fife-did-it-right/ ("Old people in town riled
Barney Fife because a big car was parked illegally. Barney gave a ticket and then found out it
was the governor's car. The governor wanted to see Barney, and Barney was worried. The
governor thanked Barney for doing his job."); Barney and the Govenor, IMBD,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0512448/.
360. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
361. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016); Brief for Respondent, supra note 185, at
15.
362. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 2063.
364. Odis Shavonne, Hill Street Blues 'Let's Be Careful Out There,' YOUTUBE (Oct. 6,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_plkkzDagsY.
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In the seminal Fourth Amendment case, Terry v. Ohio, the Court, in
speaking of the Fourth Amendment, declared, "No right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law." 365
The Court in Terry recognized its "traditional responsibility to guard
against police conduct" that trenched upon "personal security without the
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires," while
still approving "restrained investigative conduct undertaken on the basis of
ample factual justification." 366 By increments over the decades, the Court
seems to have strayed from this mission. Now, after Strieff, the right of the
individual to control one's own person has lost its sacred status.
365. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
366. Id. at 15.
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